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The Beginning of the End: The Demise of Bank Partnerships with
Payday Lenders
When banks eliminated profit-draining services in the
1980s, millions of low-income households were left with little
access to financial services.1 Consumers seeking short-term loans
for small amounts found that banks did not offer such loans.2
Because many of these consumers could not qualify for a credit
card, they were forced to search elsewhere to fulfill their credit
needs.3 Payday lenders provided access to cash to those who had
minimal access to banks.4 Since the early 1990s, the amount of
payday loans issued has risen from virtually zero to about fifteen
billion dollars a year.'
When one borrows money from a payday lender, the
borrower typically writes a personal check payable to the lender.6
The amount payable represents the amount the borrower wishes
to borrow, in addition to a fee.7 Usually, the fee equals a
percentage of the value borrowed or a fee per each one hundred
dollars loaned.8 In many states, the borrower maintains three
options after writing the lender the check. 9 At any time, the
borrower may pay the lender the amount of the check's face value
in order to redeem his or her check, minus the fee."° The
1. Scott Andrew Schaaf, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the Payday
Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 340 (2001).
2. Id. In the 1980s, deregulation of banking drove banks to eliminate services
that lost money, such as bank accounts with small balances and free checking
accounts. Lisa Blaylock Moss, Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment
Transactions & the Need for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1732 (2000).
3. Schaaf, supra note 1, at 340.
4. Id. at 339.
5. Paul Beckett, U.S. Tells Bank to End Support of Payday Loan, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 4, 2002, at C15.
6. Schaaf, supra note 1, at 341. Thus, the borrower must have a checking
account against which he writes a post-dated check. See id. The check cannot be
cashed until its date, which is presumably after the borrower's next payday. See id. at
342.
7. Id. at 341.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 342.
10. Id.
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borrower's second option is to allow the lender to cash the check
after the loan period." Finally, if the borrower cannot afford to
pay the loan, many states allow the lender to extend the loan for
another loan period, resulting in the borrower again paying the
finance charge.' 2 Because most of the payday lenders charge flat
fees, the loans carry exorbitant annual percentage rates, 3 typically
ranging from 250 percent to more than 1000 percent. 4
Many states have enacted strict usury laws prohibiting the
high interest rates charged by payday lenders, 15 while other states
have enacted laws prohibiting payday lending altogether. 16 Even
with these restrictions, the practice frequently makes its way into
such states through lenders partnering with a national bank
located in a different state that lacks strict usury laws. 7 Recently,
federal courts have been asked to decide whether payday lenders
may take advantage of what many have referred to as a "loophole"
in the law.'8
Part I of this Note will examine state regulation of payday
lending.' 9 Part II will explain the role of federal law in payday
lending. 20 Part III will discuss recent strikes against payday
11. Moss, supra note 2, at 1729.
12. Schaaf, supra note 1, at 342.
13. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial
Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current
Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 602
(2000).
14. Beckett, supra note 5, at C15. In North Carolina, average payday loans
charge 400 percent and greater interest rates. Payday Lending in North Carolina,
Borrowers Trapped in a Cycle of Debt (July 29, 2002), at http://www.responsible
lending.org/pdfs/Payday-Lending-Trapped in Debt_072902.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2002). By comparison, credit card rates typically range from twenty-one to thirty-five
percent. Id.
15. See Party Yards Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
16. See Paul Beckett, Risky Business: Exploiting a Loophole, Banks Skirt State
Laws on High Interest Rates, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at 1. In recent years,
Virginia's attorney general has sued payday lenders, effectively removing them from
the state. Id.
17. Charles A. Bruch, Taking The Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting An End to
the Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged By Payday Lenders, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1261 (2001).
18. See Ben Jackson, Federal Courts at Odds Over Payday Lending Pact, AM.
BANKER, June 6, 2002, at 5; see also Beckett, supra note 5, at C15.
19. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
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lenders' partnering with national banks.21 Part IV will explore the
future of such partnerships. 2
I. STATE REGULATION OF PAYDAY LOANS

In an amendment to the Truth in Lending Act's Official
Staff Commentary, the Federal Reserve Board ruled that payday
lenders must publish annual interest rates.23 Also, the Federal
Trade Commission has brought charges against payday lenders for
false representation to consumers. 24 Although these federal
regulations exist, payday lenders are primarily regulated by the
states.25
Many states have enacted usury laws that establish interest
rate ceilings.26 States fall into three categories with regard to the
regulation of payday lending. 27 One group of states requires
payday lenders to comply with usury restrictions. 28 Another group
allows payday lenders to charge any interest rate they choose.2 9
Finally, a group of states permits payday lending, but governs such
lending through specific payday loan statutes.3 °

21. See infra notes 51-150 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 151-182 and accompanying text.
23. Official Staff Interpretations (Commentary to Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226
(2000).
24. FTC, in First Move Against Payday Lenders, Reaches Settlement with Nevada
Companies,69 U.S. LAW WK., Sept. 19, 2000, at 2151.
25. See Schaaf, supra note 1, at 356.
26. See Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000). The Court in Party Yards held that to establish that a transaction is usurious,
the party must show: (1) an express or implied loan, (2) a requirement for repayment,
(3) an agreement to pay interest in excess of the legal rate, and (4) a corrupt intent to
take more than the legal rate. Id. The Court noted that corrupt intent is established
if the evidence indicates that the lender knowingly charged or received interest in
excess of the legal rate, considering all of the surrounding circumstances. Id.
27. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1260.
28. Id. at 1260-61. Twenty states require payday lenders to comply with usury
restrictions. Id.
29. Id. at 1261. Eight states allow payday lenders to charge any interest rate they
choose. Id.
30. Id. Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have specific payday loan
statutes. Id.
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FEDERAL LAW PERMITTING BANK EXPORTATION OF
INTEREST RATES

One piece of federal legislation in particular allows payday
lenders to bypass the constraints of state usury laws.31 Section 85,
known as the National Bank Act, has emerged as an enabling
statute for payday lenders.32 The Act allows national banks to
charge customers in other states interest rates limited only by the
usury statutes of the state in which the national bank is physically
located.33 Enacted in 1864, the Act sought to advantage weak
national banks and state banks.34 The Act did not seek to provide
a loophole for payday lenders, nor could those enacting the
legislation even envision such a purpose.35 Payday lending is a
modern problem finding a solution in long-standing legislation.36
Under Section 85, national banks may export the usury law
of their home state nationwide. 37 The laws of a particular national
bank's home state then preempt any state laws restricting interest
in the borrower's state. 38 The Act affects payday lending when
payday lenders affiliate with federal banks located in states with
no or minimal interest rate restrictions.39 Once affiliated with
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1262.
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2001).
34. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262. In Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Missouri, the
Supreme Court articulated the purpose of the legislation:
It cannot be doubted, in view of the purpose of Congress in

providing for the organization of National banking associations,
that it was intended to give them a firm footing in the different
States where they might be located. It was expected they would
come into competition with State banks, and it was intended to
give them at least equal advantages in such competition. In order
to accomplish this they were empowered to reserve interest at the
same rates, whatever those rates might be, which were allowed to
similar State institutions. This was considered indispensable to
protect them against possible unfriendly State legislation.
Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409, 412 (1873).
35. See 12 U.S.C. § 85.
36. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262.
37. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 13, at 646; see also Cades v. H & R Block, Inc.,
43 F.3d 869, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that an out-of-state bank's use of a local
agent to make loans did not affect the preemptive force of the National Bank Act).
38. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 13, at 646.
39. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262.
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these banks, payday lenders may charge their customers any
interest rate allowed in the state of the bank, even if the customers
reside in states having restrictive usury statutes.4" Thus, payday
lenders circumvent state usury laws by forming partnerships with
banks holding national charters.4
At the end of 1999, seven national banks had partnered
with payday lenders.42 A report issued in 2001 by the Consumer
Federation of America and the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group listed nine banks that worked with payday lenders.43 Some
of these national banks contribute nothing more to the partnership
44
than allowing the payday lender access to their state's usury laws.
Currently, approximately twelve banks partner with payday
lenders. 45 These partnerships of national banks and payday
lenders account for an estimated ten percent of all payday loans
issued.46
In addition to Section 85, a federal statute enacted in 1980
provides the same possibility for interest rate exportation to state
Like Section 85, Section 1831d seeks to prevent
banks. 47
discrimination against state banks. 48 The legislation provides that
the interest rates of a foreign bank, with a charter in a particular
state, preempt the interest rates allowable by the state in which the
foreign bank is chartered.4 9 Thus, the legislation provides a vehicle
for payday lenders to escape state usury laws by partnering with a
foreign bank.5 °

40. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 319
(1978).
41. Beckett, supra note 5.
42. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262 (citing Senate Forum on Short-Term, HighInterest Paycheck Advances, Before the Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs,
106h Cong. (1999) (forum held by Sen. Joseph Lieberman), available at 1999 WL
1242421, at *27).
43. Ben Jackson, Brickyard is Latest to Quit Payday Lending, AM. BANKER, Sept.
18, 2002, at 1.
44. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 13, at 604-05.
45. Beckett, supra note 5, at C15.
46. Id.
47. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (2001).
48. See Greenwood Trust v. Mass., 971 F.2d 818 (1S Cir. 1992).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.
50. Id.
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III. RECENT STRIKES AT PAYDAY LENDERS' PARTNERING
WITH NATIONAL BANKS

A.

State Action

States are beginning to strike the payday lending industry's
practice of circumventing state usury laws by partnering with
national banks.51 A new law in Maryland prohibits any company
in the state from acting as a broker for payday loans from a
national bank.52 Since 1999, officials at the New York State
Banking Department have sent letters to lenders, noting that
charging more than twenty-five percent interest is criminal under
New York law.53 Although legislation regulating payday lenders'
partnerships with national banks expired in North Carolina in
2001," 4 the North Carolina legislature is considering similar
regulation.55
In March 2002, Indiana enacted a law to prohibit banks
from partnering with payday lenders.56 The chief counsel for the
state's Department of Financial Institutions, J. Phillip Goddard,
accused payday lenders and banks partnering with them of
"greed." 57 This action by Indiana forced Republic First Bancorp,
Inc. of Philadelphia, a company with $680 million in assets, to exit
the state.58 Republic First Bancorp, Inc. accounted for sixty-five
percent of the short-term loan business in the state. 9

51. See John Reosti, Why Republic First Still Likes Tax, Payday Loans, AM.
BANKER, July 2, 2002, at 1.

52. Beckett, supra note 16, at 1.
53. See id.
54. Schaaf, supra note 1, at 359.
55. Kamal Wallace, State Lawmakers Look at Ways to Regulate Payday Lending
(October 1, 2002), at http://www.wral.com/money/1696034/detail.html.
56. Reosti, supranote 51, at 1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. Republic First Bancorp, Inc. first entered the payday lending business
when it partnered with Check Into Cash, Inc., a payday lender located in Cleveland,
Tennessee. Id.
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FederalAction

Recently, the United States government has taken action.6 °
On January 3, 2002, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) ordered Eagle National Bank of Upper Darby,
Pennsylvania to stop providing payday loans to one of the nation's
largest payday lenders, Dollar Financial Group. 6' This order
provided the first concrete evidence of the OCC's disapproval of
alliances between national banks and payday lenders.6 2 The OCC
emphasized Eagle National Bank's lack of supervision of the loan
program.6 3
In the order, the Comptroller of the Currency, John D.
Hawke, Jr. stated: "Eagle simply did not .have the capacity to
manage the relationship."'
Hawke continued: "The bank
essentially rented out its national bank charter to a payday lender
to facilitate [Dollar's] evasion of the requirements of state law that
would otherwise be applicable to it."' 65 Hawke emphasized that
the OCC based its action against Eagle on an examination of how
Eagle National Bank ran the loan program, rather than on the
66
existence of the alliance itself.
Noting the shortcomings of the arrangement, Hawke
pointed out that Dollar Financial Group had opened stores in
some states and had begun originating payday loans without Eagle
National Bank's knowledge or approval.67 Ultimately, Hawke
termed the arrangement between Eagle National Bank and Dollar
Financial Group as "charter abuse., 68 Declaring the purpose of
the OCC's action, Hawke stated: "We don't want to see the
national bank charter used by nonbank entities as a way of evading

60. Beckett, supra note 5, at C1.
61. OCC Consent Order No. 2001-104 (January 3, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea200l-lO4.pdf. Dollar Financial Group had been
offering Eagle National Bank's loans in forty states. See Beckett, supra note 5, at C1.
62. Beckett, supra note 5, at C1.
63. Id.
64. Idat C15 (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.).
65. Id. (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.).
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state law.",69 Regarding the OCC's decision, the consumer
protection director at the Consumer Federation of America
commented: "Eagle National Bank and Dollar Financial Group
pioneered the rent-a-bank payday loan arrangement to get around
state laws."7 The consumer protection director stated that "[t]he
OCC's action is an important first step toward closing that
loophole."7 '
In October 2002, the OCC took another step in that
direction.72 The OCC ordered Goleta National Bank to stop
providing payday loans through the offices of Ace Cash Express,
Inc., the nation's largest check-cashing chain.73 A spokesperson
for the OCC said that Ace's failure to safeguard customer files on
loans issued by Goleta prompted the order.74 The OCC also found
that Ace committed "unsafe and unsound practices including a
pattern of excessive exceptions to Goleta's policies and
procedures."75 Ace agreed to pay a fine of $250,000 and Goleta
agreed to a fine of $75,000.76 Comptroller of the Currency John D.
Hawke, Jr. said: "Ace's inability to safeguard the files of customers
whose loans were booked at Goleta shows just how risky those
relationships can be between banks and payday lenders."77
The OCC is also seeking to issue an enforcement action
against People's National Bank of Paris, Texas, a company with

69. Id. (quoting Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr.).
70. Id. (quoting Jean Ann Fox, consumer protection director at the Consumer
Federation of America).
71. Id. (quoting Jean Ann Fox, consumer protection director at the Consumer

Federation of America).
72. Paul Beckett, 'Payday' Loans Are Dealt Blow By Regulators, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 30, 2002, at C1.
73. OCC Consent Order No. 2002-93 (October 29, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/Goleta%20Consent.pdf. Goleta National Bank is
located in Goleta, California and has $302 million in assets. Jackson, supra note 43,
at 1. Ace Cash Express, Inc. is based in Irving, Texas. Id.
74. Jackson, supra note 43, at 1. In August, more than 600 customer files were
discarded in a dumpster in Portsmouth, Virginia. Id. A spokesperson for the OCC
said this discarding could have compromised the customers' right to privacy. Id. Ace
Cash Express was unable to account for 641 of those files. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. The OCC also required Goleta to notify all borrowers whose loan files
were lost and to advise those customers on potential identity theft. Id.
77. Id.
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$103 million dollars in assets.78 In support of its action, the OCC
claims People's National Bank is operating an illegal payday
lending business.7 9 Contesting the action, People's National Bank
has filed suit in federal court.8"
Notwithstanding the actions by the OCC, federal legislation
is also pending.8 The Payday Borrower Protection Act of 2001, if
passed, would prohibit payday loans unless authorized and
regulated by state law.8 2 Moreover, the Act would disallow the
exportation of interest rates for payday loans.83 It would achieve
this by prohibiting a national bank from using a payday lender as
an agent unless "such loan is in full compliance with the law of the
State in which such loan is made."8 4 Therefore, the interest rate
would have to comply with the usury laws of the state in which the
loan is made, not the home state of the national bank. 8
C.

The Supreme Court'sExamination of a Similar Issue

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the precise
issue of payday lending, the Court has examined a similar issue.8 6
In Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha
Service Corporation, Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis, a
Minnesota-chartered national banking association, brought suit
against First National Bank of Omaha, a national banking
association chartered in Nebraska.87 Marquette brought suit to
enjoin the operation of First National Bank of Omaha's credit card
78. OCC Cease & Desist Order No. AA-EC-02-03 (May 17, 2002), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov; Jackson, supra note 43, at 1.
79. Jackson, supra note 43, at 1.
80. See id.
81. See H.R. 1319, 107th Cong. (2001).
82. See id. at 3-4.
83. See id. at 13. The bill proposes: "To amend the Consumer Credit Protection
Act and other banking laws to protect consumers who avail themselves of payday
loans from usurious interest rates and other unfair practices by payday lenders, to
encourage the states to license and closely regulate payday lenders, and for other
purposes." Id. at 1.
84. See id. at 4-5.
85. See id. at 13.
86. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 302
(1978).
87. Id. at 299.
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program in Minnesota until the bank complied with Minnesota's
usury laws.88
The issue before the Court was whether the National Bank
Act authorized a national bank based in one state to charge its
out-of-state credit-card customers an interest rate on unpaid
balances allowed by its home state, when that rate was greater
than that permitted by the nonresident customers' state.89 The
Court held that the National Bank Act allowed the bank to charge
the higher rate.9"
Although the credit-card program at issue in Marquette
does not equate with payday lending per se, the resemblance
between the two is compelling. Both programs essentially involve
an extension of credit, and the Court in Marquette noted that the
credit-card program enabled cardholders to obtain cash advances
from participating banks,9 just as a payday lender offers cash in
advance.9 2 Another similarity between the credit card program
and payday lenders who partner with national banks is that the
credit-card program was operated by another corporation.93
One difference between the credit card arrangement and
that of a payday lender partnering with a national bank is that the
credit-card program was operated by a company wholly owned by
the national bank. 94 Marquette fails to shed light on the National
Bank Act's effect on payday lenders because the agent of the
95
national bank did not claim to extend credit in Marquette.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 301.
Id.
See id. at 301-02.
See Schaaf, supra note 1.
See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 302

(1978).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 307-08. The Court declined to rule on the issue in the case of an
agent of the national bank purporting to extend credit. See id. Accordingly, the
Court's reasoning for its holding bears no implication for payday lenders. Id. at 308.
It merely affirmed the National Bank Act's allowance of national banks to charge
interest rates permitted by their home states. See id. The Court declared that the
First National Bank of Omaha was a national bank, and thus, it was an
"instrumentalit[y] of the federal government, created for a public purpose, and as
such necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United States." Id. After
asserting that the interest rate that the First National Bank of Omaha charged is
governed by federal law, the Court stated that the National Bank Act "plainly
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D. Two Federal Courts Take Different Approaches
1. Ace Cash Express, Inc. v. Lingerfelt

Recently, federal courts have been asked to examine the
partnership between payday lenders and national banks. 96 The
97
first approach comes out of Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt.
Plaintiffs Goleta National Bank and Ace Cash Express, Inc.

brought an action to enjoin North Carolina officials from enforcing
state lending and consumer protection laws against Ace Cash
Express, Inc. with regard to its practice of payday lending.98 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina granted the state's motion to dismiss the suit.99
Goleta National Bank and Ace Cash Express, Inc.'s action
stemmed from a previous lawsuit.
In January 2002, the

Commissioner of Banks of North Carolina and the Attorney
General of North Carolina, acting on behalf of the State, filed suit

against Ace."° The State alleged that Ace Cash Express was
engaged in payday lending that violated North Carolina's usury
statutes."' Ace Cash Express removed the case to federal court,
asserting that federal question jurisdiction existed because the
provides that a national bank may charge interest 'on any loan' at the rate allowed by
the laws of the State in which the bank is 'located."' Id. Therefore, said the Court, if
the Bank was "located" in Nebraska, it would be entitled to charge its Minnesota
customers the rate of interest authorized by Nebraska law. Id. Interestingly,
Marquette argued that "[i]n the context of a national bank which systematically
solicits Minnesota residents for credit cards to be used in transactions with Minnesota
merchants the bank must be deemed to be 'located' in Minnesota for purposes of this
credit card program." Id. at 310. The Court disagreed. Id. Stating that a national
bank was "located" in the state named in its organization certificate, the Court
asserted that the First National Bank of Omaha "cannot be deprived of this location
merely because it is extending credit to residents of a foreign state." Id. The
rationale the Court offered is that "Minnesota residents were always free to visit
Nebraska and receive loans in that State." Id.
96. See Jackson, supra note 18, at 5.
97. See Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 711 (E.D.N.C. 2002).
Hal D. Lingerfelt served as the Commissioner of Banks of North Carolina. Id. The
Honorable Roy Cooper was also named as a defendant in his official capacity as the
Attorney General of North Carolina. Id.
98. Id. at 713.
99. Id.
100. Id. The suit was filed in the Superior Court of Wake County, North Carolina.
Id.
101. Id; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1.
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State's claims were preempted by the National Bank Act. 0 2 The
federal court ultimately granted the State's motion to remand the
case to Wake County Superior Court, concluding that the National
Bank Act did not completely preempt a state action against Ace
Cash Express, a non-national bank.'0 3 The federal court reasoned
that the Goleta National Bank and Ace Cash Express are separate
entities, and stated: "The Complaint strictly is about a non-bank's
violation of state law. It alleges no claims against a national bank
under the NBA.'"
In Wake County Superior Court, a settlement was reached
between Ace Cash Express and state officials.0 5 Under the
agreement, the attorney general dropped the suit, and Ace Cash
Express promised not to make payday loans in North Carolina for
the next twelve months. 6 Ace Cash Express must follow state law
should it resume making payday loans once the year is over. 7 To
re-enter the payday lending business, Ace Cash Express
additionally must obtain a state license. 8
Before the settlement in Wake County Superior Court,
Goleta National Bank and Ace Cash Express requested the
following relief in Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt: (1) a declaration
that the National Bank Act preempts the state action claim against
Ace Cash Express, (2) a declaration that any North Carolina law
which prohibits Ace Cash Express from engaging in payday
lending violates the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to liberty and
property, and (3) an injunction preventing the State from
enforcing the North Carolina laws at issue in the state action
against either Ace Cash Express or Goleta National Bank.0 9
Plaintiffs argued that the National Bank Act asserts that the
allowable interest rate on payday loans is determined by Goleta's
102. Goleta Nat'l Bank, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
103. See id. at 713.
104. See id. at 711.
105. Ben Jackson, Ace, N.C. Reach Settlement But Disagree on the Results, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 18, 2002.
106. Id.
107. Payday Lender Agrees to StopMaking High-Fee Loans, RALEIGH NEWS &
OBSERVER, Dec. 15, 2002, at 4B. Ace Cash Express, with at least 16 branch offices in
North Carolina, was charging an effective annual percentage rate of 443 percent. Id.
108. Id.

109. See Goleta Nat'l Bank, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
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home state, California." ° Secondly, the plaintiffs claimed that
because 12 U.S.C. § 24 authorized Goleta to use an agent to make
loans, North Carolina laws prohibiting Ace Cash Express from
making payday loans violated the plaintiffs' rights under federal
law."' Third, the plaintiffs asserted that, under 12 U.S.C. § 484,
the United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has
exclusive authority to regulate national banks, and therefore, the
State's efforts to enforce its laws against Ace Cash Express
violated the plaintiffs' rights under federal law.' 12 Finally, the
plaintiffs alleged that North Carolina law, as applied against Ace
Cash Express, violated the Fourteenth Amendment in that it
deprived Ace Cash Express and Goleta National Bank of
economic liberty and property without due process. 113
The State argued that Ace Cash Express (the payday
lender), not Goleta National Bank (the national bank), made the
loans at issue in the state action." 4 Goleta and Ace Cash Express
asserted that Ace Cash Express was merely Goleta's agent in
promoting, originating, and servicing these loans." 5 Therefore, the
federal court acknowledged that the identity of the true lender was
16
a disputed fact in both the federal and state action.'
Ultimately, the court dismissed the federal suit, finding no
merit in Ace Cash Express's argument that the National Bank
Act's preemption rendered the state action facially conclusive." 7
Regarding the state action, the federal court stated:
While it is true that the NBA does preempt state
efforts to regulate the interest collected by national
banks, the NBA patently does not apply to nonnational banks. In this case, the state action claims
are asserted against Ace, a non-national bank.
Although Ace contends that Goleta is the real
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 714.
Id.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 711.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 718.
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maker of the loans at issue, the State contends just
the opposite: that Ace is using Goleta's name as
mere subterfuge for its own unlawful lending
practices. Thus, a sharp factual issue is presented as
to whether Goleta, a national bank, is the real
18
lender at issue.'
This federal court's interpretation of the National Bank
Act proves consistent with its purpose.119 At the time of its
enactment in 1864, the Act sought to provide an advantage to
weaker national banks. 2 ' The Act did not seek to provide a
loophole for payday lenders. 12 1 In fact, those enacting the
legislation could not even envision such a purpose as payday
22
lending is a modern practice.
2. Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc.
Another federal court has taken a different stance than that
taken by the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of North Carolina.1 23 The second approach adopted by a federal
court comes out of Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc. 124 Hudson
sued defendants Ace Cash Express, several of its officers, and
Goleta National Bank for making a payday loan in violation of
Indiana usury law and other federal laws. 125 Defendants moved to
dismiss all asserted claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.'26 The United States District Court for the

118. Id. at 717-18.
119. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2001).
120. Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262.
121. See 12 U.S.C. § 85.
122. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262.
123. See Jackson, supra note 18, at 5.
124. Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2002 WL 1205060, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 30,
2002).
125. Id. The plaintiff argued that the loan violated Indiana usury law, the federal
Truth in Lending Act, and the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. Id. Because Hudson asserted two claims arising under federal
law, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. Id.
126. Id.
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Southern District of Indiana granted defendants' motion to
1 27
dismiss.
In Hudson, the plaintiff contended that a genuine issue
existed as to whether Goleta National Bank or Ace Cash Express
was the actual lender.1 28 Asserting that Goleta National Bank was
not the lender, the plaintiff argued that Goleta's role in servicing
her loan was so insignificant that the court should regard Ace as
29
the true lender, despite the fact that Goleta issued the loan.
Also, the plaintiff suggested that the district court should regard
Ace Cash Express "as the true lender because defendants' lending
arrangement was designed for-the sole purpose of circumventing
Indiana usury law." 30
The district court accepted the plaintiff's factual premises
regarding Goleta National Bank's role and the defendants'
purposes in making the loans."' After recognizing its acceptance
of the plaintiff's premises, the district court stated: "These
arguments might appeal to those who believe substance should
always trump form in the law, and they may provide a reasonable
foundation for closer federal regulation of national banks that
engage in such transactions. These arguments do not, however,
32
offer a basis for giving Hudson any relief."
The district court in Hudson cited the Supreme Court case
Marquette National Bank, which held that the National Bank Act
authorizes a national bank in one state to charge its out-of-state
credit card customers any interest rate allowed by its home state,
even when the rate charged is greater than the rate permitted by
the customer's home state.133 In examining Marquette, the district
court in Hudson noted that the Supreme Court recognized that the
National Bank Act "will significantly impair the ability of States to
enact effective usury laws.' ' 134 The Supreme Court added that "the
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
*4.
134.

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text; Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at
Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 318
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protection of state usury laws is an issue of legislative policy, and
any plea to alter § 85 to [protect state usury laws] is better
addressed to the wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of the
Court."' 135 Likening the case to Marquette National Bank, the
district court in Hudson asserted that in both cases, the plaintiff
challenged a national bank's practice of imposing finance charges
allowed by its home state on its out-of-state customers whose
states of residence would outlaw such charges.' 36
Additionally, the district court analogized the case with
that in an Eighth Circuit decision, Krispin v. May Dep't Stores
Co.'
In Krispin, the defendant, a Missouri department store,
issued credit cards to the plaintiffs in Missouri. 138 Later, the store
assigned its entire interest in the credit cards to a national bank in
Arizona. 139 The store then issued a notice to the plaintiffs stating
that the Arizona national bank was extending credit. 4 ° The store,
however, purchased the credit card receivables originated by the
bank on a daily basis and collected and received cardholders'
payments.'' The plaintiffs sued the store, alleging that the late
fees charged on their credit card violated Missouri law.'4 2
In support of the position that the National Bank Act did
not apply, the plaintiffs in Krispin asserted: (1) the plaintiffs
entered into their credit agreements with the Missouri store, (2)
the Missouri store "remained substantially involved in the
collection process," and (3) the Missouri store retained a financial
interest in the accounts even after assigning its interest to the
Arizona national bank.'
The Eighth Circuit held that the
National Bank Act applied to the credit agreements.'" In deciding
whether the National Bank Act applied, the Eighth Circuit stated
(1979); see Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at *4.
135. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 439 U.S. at 319; see Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at *4.
136. Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at *4.
137. See id.
138. See Krispin v. May Dep't Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2000);
Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at*4.
139. Krispin, 218 F.3d at 921-22.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 923.
142. Id. at 922.
143. See id. at 923.
144. See id. at 922-23.
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that the originating entity (in that case, the bank) served as the
determinative factor. 4 5 Relying on Krispin, the Court in Hudson
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.14 6
Although the district court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, in Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, ruled
consistently with the purpose of the National Bank Act, the
federal court's reasoning in Hudson proves most consistent with
that of the Supreme Court in Marquette.4 ' The federal court in
Hudson refused to sacrifice form for substance in determining
preemption under the National Bank Act. 148 The court failed to
inquire as to the identity of the real lender-Goleta National Bank
or Ace Cash Express. 149 In determining preemption under the
Act, the identity of the true lender proves essential even when
form is not compromised in interpreting the Act. 5 °
IV.

PAYDAY LENDER AND NATIONAL BANK PARTNERSHIPS
IN THE FUTURE

As state legislatures and courts attack partnerships
between payday lenders and national banks, payday lenders are
beginning to take drastic measures to keep their business alive. 51
Check 'n Go serves as a payday lender, with 670 outlets in twentyfour states.'52 Recently, the investors who own Check 'n Go's
parent company, CNG Financial Inc., created a company to
purchase a bank. 5 3 That company, Cincinnati BancGroup Inc.,
applied to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago to acquire Bank
of Kenney in Illinois, and thereby become a bank holding

145. Id. at 922-24.
146. See Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2002 WL 1205060, at *8 (S.D. Ind.
May 30, 2002).
147. See id; Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301
(1979); Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718 (2002).
148. Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at *4.
149. See id.
150. See Goleta Nat'l Bank, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 717-18.
151. See Ben Jackson, Can't Rent? Payday Shop Files to Buy a Charter, AM.
BANKER, July 9, 2002, at 1.
152. See id.
153. Id.
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company.'54 This is the first time a payday lender has ever
attempted to buy a bank.'55
Opponents argue that Cincinnati BancGroup is trying to
circumvent state usury laws that ban or restrict payday lending. 56
They assert that approving the purchase would encourage payday
lenders with sufficient funds available for such a purchase to buy
small banks.'57 An attorney at the National Center on Poverty
Law in Chicago said the opponents fear that the payday lender
would be incorporated as part of the Bank of Kenney.'
Under
the National Bank Act, the bank could then "export" to other
states the high rates permitted by Illinois usury law.159 Thus,
buying the Bank of Kenney would allow CNG Financial Services,
Inc. to forego partnering with another bank in order to export the
high rates permitted by the state of organization of that particular
bank. 6 ° Opponents stress that Check 'n Go notoriously facilitates
federal laws in order to avoid consumer protection laws.' 6 ' For
instance, Check 'n Go has been providing payday loans to
62
consumers in North Carolina, where payday lending is illegal.
Check 'n Go accomplished this by acting as a broker of short-term
63
loans for a national bank in Illinois.
Protesting the purchase are four members of Illinois'
congressional delegation. 64 Questioning CNG Financial Inc.'s
business plan, they urged that a public hearing be held to "discuss

154. Id. The chairman of Bank of Kenney stated that the Bank was not looking
for a buyer; Cincinnati BancGroup approached it. Id. at 1, 6.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Jackson, supra note 151, at 6. The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago has
received 50 comment letters, most opposing the purchase. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Jackson, supra note 151. Check 'n Go acts as a broker for Brickyard Bank,
located in Lincolnwood, Illinois. Id.Brickyard Bank has $193 million in assets. Id.
But recently Brickyard Bank announced that the bank was terminating its
partnerships with payday lenders. Jackson, supra note 43.
164. Jackson, supra note 151. Those four members are Representatives Danny K.
Davis, Jesse L. Jackson, Jr., Bobby L. Rush, and Janice D. Schakowsky. Id. All are
Democrats. Id.
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the negative ramifications of a payday lender becoming a bank." 165
They stated: "If the application is approved, we believe it will
make a sham of the integrity of the banking regulatory framework
by allowing Cincinnati BancGroup to use bank privileges to make
166
predatory, high-cost payday loans."'
Countering
this claim, John Bruno,
Cincinnati
BancGroup's President and Senior Vice President of CNG
Financial, Inc., said owning a bank would facilitate access to funds
167
from Federal Home Loan Banks and other sources.
Furthermore, Bruno stated that the purchase would help
Cincinnati BancGroup raise equity capital more successfully than
168
it could as CNF Financial, Inc.

As a result of the crackdown on partnerships between
payday lenders and national banks, banks are leaving the
business. 169 Recently, at least three banks have voluntarily left the
practice of payday lending.17 ° Brickyard Bank of Lincolnwood,
Illinois announced that the bank was terminating its partnerships
with payday lenders.' 7 ' Specifically, Brickyard Bank's Chairman,
President, and Chief Executive Officer, David L. Keller, cited a
September 3, 2002 order by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
(FDIC) and the Illinois Office of Banks and Real Estate as the
reason for the bank's decision.'72
The order required the bank, a company with $200 million
in assets, to raise its capital by one dollar for every one dollar
outstanding in payday loans.'73 Keller said that this order made
payday lending "too expensive" for Brickyard Bank.'74 As reason
for the order, the FDIC and the Illinois Office of Banks and Real
Estate charged Brickyard Bank with "operating with an

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Jackson, supra note 43.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See id.; see FDIC Cease and Desist Order, available at http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/individual/enforcement/11967.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
173. Jackson, supra note 43.
174. See id.
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inadequate level of capital protection for the kind and quality of
assets held."' 75 The order also stated that Brickyard Bank did not
monitor Check 'n Go properly. 7 6 Stating that the FDIC was
following supervisory guidelines issued by federal banking
agencies, a spokesman for the FDIC said, "This guidance indicates
that we'll ask banks to hold increased reserves, including dollarfor-dollar capital for riskier lending activities on a case-by-case
, 177
basis."
Other banks are not as quick to leave the business.178 Upon
hearing that Brickyard Bank terminated its partnership with
Check 'n Go, a number of other banks contacted Check 'n Go,
hoping to enter the business. 179 Although forced to stop payday
lending in Indiana, Republic First Bancorp, Inc. of Philadelphia
plans to continue such business."' The company continues to look
for payday lending opportunities, and the company's president,
Harry Madonna, said short-term loans would remain one of the
company's endeavors, "despite the setback in Indiana and the
general controversy surrounding the relationships."''
Although Brickyard Bank left the business, the bank's
Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, David L.
Keller, stated that he believes consumer need for payday lending
exists and that payday lending can be a profitable service for banks
despite the risks.'82
VI. CONCLUSION

While the payday lending industry is being attacked by
state legislation, pending federal legislation, the OCC, and in suits
across the country, the industry finds a shield in the National Bank
Act.'83 By partnering with national banks, payday lenders find
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Jackson, supra note 43.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Reosti, supra note 51.
See id.
See Jackson, supra note 43.
See supra notes 31-150 and accompanying text.
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refuge under the National Bank Act's allowance of interest rate
exportation."i 4 These partnerships allow payday lenders to charge
interest rates that otherwise would be illegal in states with
restrictive usury laws.'85
Enacted in the nineteenth century, the National Bank Act
sought to advantage weaker federal banks and state banks. 8 6 The
Act did not seek to provide a loophole for payday lenders, nor
could those enacting the legislation even envision such a
purpose. 8 7 Payday lending is a modern problem finding refuge in
long-standing legislation.'88 When the national bank's involvement
is facially minimal, the National Bank Act should not provide an
avenue for payday lenders to escape state laws.' 89 To allow this is
to permit federal legislation to trump state legislation on an issue
that the federal legislation was not meant to address. 9 °
While a significant demand for the short-term loans as
provided by payday lenders is evident by the explosion of the
industry in recent years, the customer's need is exactly what gives
the lender leverage. 9' When states adopt laws to prevent lenders
from charging excessive interest rates, these laws should not be
circumvented by a federal act never envisioned to apply to such an
issue."' Until the courts look substantively to the administration
of payday loans, the states' prerogative to outlaw payday lending
will continue to collapse in the face of the National Bank Act.
TASHA L. WINEBARGER

184. See Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 2002 WL 1205060, at *4 (S.D. Ind.
May 30, 2002). But see Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718
(2002).
185. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 13, at 646-47.
186. See Bruch, supra note 17, at 1262.
187. See 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2001).
188. See Schaaf, supra note 1, at 339.
189. See Goleta Nat'l Bank, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
190. See 12 U.S.C. § 85.
191. See Schaaf, supra note 1, at 345.
192. See 12 U.S.C. § 85.
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